ISFECÍ-~OS COSTROI. ASD HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOL~GY
October 1994 geons, the Amencan Dental Association, and numerous other professional organizations opposed the CDC recornmendati~ns.~,~ Further, the National Commission on AIDS carne out strongly against mandatory screening proposals, calling them counterproductive and stating that they may "ultimately cause greater patient rnorbidity and mortality than they pre~ent."~ Professional opposition has rested on the conviction that the risk of transmission of H N from practitioner to patient is very small, even dunng invasive procedures. Our analysis examines a related claim against HIV testing, that it constitutes a poor use of limited healthcare resources. This argument maintains that funds would be better spent on health programs that are more effective than screening healthcare workers for HlY Our first objective is to estimate the costeffectiveness of four HiV screening strategies íor surgeons and dentists to allow comparisons with other lifesaving interventions. A second objective is to determine the relative (incremental) cost-effective ness of the types of screening programs that have been proposed.
SCREENING ALTERNATIVES
We estimate the costeffectiveness of mandatory, voluntary, one-time, and annual H N screening programs for two classes of healthcare workers: surgeons and dentists. We focus on these occupations because both frequently perform invasive procedures, offering the most credible risk of HIV transmission, and because the costeffectiveness of prograns targeted to surgeons and dentists should provide optimistic estimates of the costeffectiveness of healthcare worker screening in general. 1° We consider the costeffectiveness of prograrr-s for surgeons and dentists separately, examining four possible screening strategies for each group: one-time voluntary screening (1TM-VOL), onetime mandatory screening (1TM-MAN), annual voluntary screening (AN-VOL), and annual mandatory screening (AN-MAN). Mandatory programs would require testing, with penalties for practitioners failing to comply. These rnight be required by law or by hospitals and insurance companies seeking to prevent lawsuits. Voluntary programs would be promvted by professional societies, federal agencies, and healthcare providers, but no incentives or penalties would be associated with the programs.
We as-me standard HiV screening procedures in our model.1' Every tested individual first is administered a single enzymelinked immunosorbent assay test (ELISA) . If the ELISA is positive, it is repeated twice; if either of the second two tests is positive, the tested individual is considered ELISA positive. ELISApositive individuals are confirrned with a single Western Blot test m). An individual is considered H N positive only if both ELISA and WB are positive.
METHODS

Cosí-Effectiveness of Programs
To determine costeffectiveness, we separately estimated the total c3sts and number of infections occurring under each of the screening scenarios, using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets (Microsoft Excel Version 4.0. Copyright 19851992). We then compared the programs with each other and with a "no screening" option. This cost-effectiveness analysis was conducted from the societal perspective.
We projected the costs and number of surgeon-topatient or dentist-tc-patient H N infections occurring under each screening scenario for a 15year period beginning on January 1, 1994. The 15-year period includes 1 year for implementation and a 14-year follow-up. We assumed that any oí these programs, if implemented, would be re-evaluated aiter this time.
For the one-time programs (voluntary and mandatory), screening is conducted only during the first year. Treatment costs for those identified and morbidity savings from transinissions prevented are projected for the remaining 14 years, but no new program costs are incurred. In the two annual screening programs, testing is conducted during each of the 15 years. There are no screening costs in the "no screening" scenario, which assumes that surgeons and dentists never are tested. However, under al1 scenanos, those HN-infected doctors developing acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) are removed frorn practice to account for departure from practice due to infection. On average, a person remains in the first stage for 5.6 years, the second stage for 4.7 years, the third stage for 1 year, and the fourth stage for 2.1 years.12J3 Therefore, persons infected with H N develop AIDS in 11.3 years on average (the total average time in stages 1 through 3). Therefore, we allow doctors who become infected during the 15-year penod to remain in practice in the "no screening" scenario and screening scenarios (when they escape detection) for 11.3 years. Doctors infected and practicing at the beginning of the screening programs are assumed to have been . HIV SC:KEESIXC; OF Si infected at a constant rate over the previous 11.3 years and are allowed to rernain in the model until they reach 11.3 years or are detected by screening. Those withdrawn from practice cannot transrnit HIV infection dunng subsequent years.
Costs of Screening
For program costs under each screening scenario, we include direct program costs, additional treatrnent costs for HIV-positive surgeons and dentists who are identified earlier than they othenvise would have been, and avoided treatment costs for patients not infected with HIV because of the screening programs.
The direct program costs include the cost of the ELiSA and WB tests and the cost of counseling. We estimate the cost of an ELISA at $3.44 and a WB at $34.67.14 These are average costs to testing sites (from a survey of federally funded testing sites) and include the cost of the test kits, personnel time, fringe benefits, and overhead. We estirnate the costs of preand posttest counseling at $39.18 for al1 tested individuals, with an additional $31.43 in counseling costs at the time of testing for HIV-positive individuals.14 The counseling costs are average costs to a testing site and include the cost of counselors, supervisors, and clencal time as well as fringe benefits and overhead. Additional costs for treatment of surgeons and dentists testing HIV positive are included in the model. We presume doctors who have progressed to stage 3 prior to the screening prograrn have identified their infections independent of the screening programs and that their HIV/AiDS treatment costs are not a result of the program. Therefore, we only include thc costs associated with stages 1 and 2 in the model. These costs include hospitaliiation, outpatient rnedical visits, horne healthcare inv~lving medical services, and drugs, and are estimated as $3,387 per year (stage 1) and $5,160 per year (stage 2) on the basis of charges by Hellinger. 12 A final component of cost is the savings in avoided treatment for HiV infections that do not occur due to the screening program. To calculate this offset, over time we follow patients who would have contracted the virus from their surgeon or dentist but did not as a result of the program. We assurne that these individuals would have identified their HIV infection and begun treatrnent in stage 3 of the disease. Stage 3 costs $11,880 per year, and stage 4 costs $33,,168 per year on average íor hospitalization, long-term care services, outpatient medical visits, home healthcare involving medical services, and drugs. 12 Our HIV/AiDS treatrnent costs for each of the four stages of HIV infection were calculated using the pw-1993 CDC AiDS definition. Under the new definition, sorne costs likely will shift from earlier to later stages, but total treatrnent costs and our costeffectiveness results will remain the same. Our rnodel predicting transitions through the four stages zlso is based on the pre-1993 CDC AiDS definition. Because we consistently used the pre-1993 AiDS definition, our total prograrn costs will not be afíected.
Costs not in the rnodel include net productivity losses for surgeons and dentists found to be HIV positive (net losses would depend on policies regard-, ing employment of HiV-positive individuals, but would reflect changes, in or loss of employment as well as productivity gains as a result of eariy treatment for practitioners identified), future costs of rnorbidity for patients who escape infection as a result of screening programs (cocts of non-HIV causes of illness and death). costs of any screening-induced injuries, and potential additional costs of a screening prograrn, such as new equiprnent, personnel, or administration. We expect that each of these excluded costs would make screening less cost-effective.
NLTMBER OF HIV INFECTIONS PREVENTED
Our rnodel defines program effectiveness as the nurnber of patient infections prevented during the lsyear period. This is an intermediate outcome rneasure, a disadvantage of which is that it does not fully reflect the ultimate goal of saving years of life. Measuring costs per transmission prevented also makes the cost-effectiveness figures less comparable to the results of other analyses, which generally measure cost per life saved or per life-year saved. 15 However, the nurnber of transrnissions prevented reflects the rnost immediate purpose of the programs, and it does not require assurnptions about length of lie. which would add to uncertainty in the analysis.
The nurnber of infections prevented is calcu1.ated from projections of the number of practitioner-topatient infections occurring without a screening prograrn and under each screening scenano. The number of patient infections occurring incorporates 1) the number of HW-positive surgeons or dentists at the beginning of the program, 2) the number of HIVpositive practitioners screened, 3) incident infections during the 15year period, 4) the ability of the screening prograrns to reduce risky contacts between HIVpositive practitioners and patients during invasive procedures, and 5) rates of HiV transrnission frorn surgeon or dentist to patient. These cornponents are described below.
HiV transmissions not included in our model include those that would occur outside of the doctorpatient relationship. For example, we do not consider, as a result of the screening programs, increases and decreases in the number of transmissions from infected doctors to their sexual and intravenous drugusing partners. Nor do we consider transmissions and prevented transmissions from patients to their sexual and intravenous dmg-using partners. Table 1 presents our estimates of the number of surgeons and dentists infected with HTV at the initiation of the screening programs on January 1, 1994. This group represents the initial number of HIVpositive practitioners who could be detected by screening programs. The numbers are calculated by miiltiplying the national estimate for the number of Hpinfecced people by the proportion of people with AIDS (reported to the CDC) who are surgeons and dentists. This assumes that the proportion of surgeons and dentists with AIDS is the sarne as the proportion with HJY infection. Our figure for infected dentists may be overestimated because the numbers used to calculate this figure included a number of dental workers other than dentists who cannot be differentiated from dentists as a result of the official AIDS reporting process. 16 To the extent that this occurred, our estimate of the nurnber of infected dentists is an overestimate. On the other hand. the CDC figures for the number of infected surgeons and dentists also may have been underestimated due to underreporting of AIDS to the CDC. biasing our estimates downward. Table 2 Under mandatory screening scenarios, we assume al1 surgeons and dentists were tested, regardless of their HIV status. Under voluntary screening scenarios, we assume 90% of HIV-positive and 50% of HW-negative surgeons and dentists are tested. This results in slightly more than 50% of al1 surgeons and dentists being tested. Our estimate of the total number screened is based on the results of a voluntary screening of orthopedic surgeons at an annual conference. during which 48% submitted to t e~t i n g .~~.~~ An unrelated survey of surgeons in Washington, DC, found that 44% had been screened for HW in the previous year (Hirsch RP, Associate Chairman for Research. Department of Health Care Sciences, George Washington Universiíy; personal communication; Apnl 1992). We assume that practitioners who believe they have been exposed to HIV either in personal or clinical contacts are more likely to pursue terting."' New grdduates included in total.
HN-Znfected Scrgecns and Dentists at Beginning of Programs
Practi.tioner Screening
HW-Infecte Surgeons and Dentists After Initial Screening
In one-time screening programs, practitioners who are H N infected as of January 1, 1994, represent the universe of detectable cases. In annual screening pmgrams, additional infections can be detected each year. These will include 1) cases rnissed (falsenegative) dunng previous years, 2) newly infected practitioners, and 3) entering new graduates who are H N infected.
The number of falsenegative test resiilts is deter. riined by the test performance of the ELISA/WB sequence. Our model assumes ELISA sensitivity of 9895 and specificity of 99.5%, and WB sensitivity of 92% and specificity of 95% among smples previously testing ELISA p~s i t i v e .~~~~ We assume that ail infected practitioners are detectable by tests fmrn the time they become infective to patients, ie, we do not account for a "window" period before the appearance of HN antibody. When an HWpositive individual screens negative (ELISA-or ELISA+/WB-), he or she remains in a full practicing clinicai position where he or she potentially cou!d transrnit the virus. We assume that the probability of transrnission by a surgeon or dentist who has a falsenegative test is the sarne as that of an unscreened HN-positive surgeon or dentist
We assume the incidence of HlV infection arnong surgeons and dentists who are uninfected at the beginning of the program to be 0.00003% per year for the remainder of the program. This estimate is derived frorn Red Cross data on repeat blood don~rs.~Tinally, we assume that the prevalence of HIV infection arnong al1 newly graduated surgeons and dentists entering their occupation is the same as the initial prevalence of H N infection arnong surgeons and dentists at the beginning of the screening prograrns.
HWositive Practitioner Risk Reduction
We assurne that rnandatory screening programs require al1 surgeons and dentists testing HIV positive to retire from practice or to elirninate al1 potentially risky patient contact. Therefore, risk of transrnission after a positive test is assumed to be zero in the mandatory screening scenarios. Under a voluntíuy screening program, we assurne that rnost of those with a positive result will reduce their tisk of transrnission in accordance with professional ethics and the recomrnendations of their professional organizat i o n~. '~.~~ We assume 90% would eliminate al1 risk of transrnission to patients, and the remaining 10% would continue to practice as before.
Surgeon-and Dentist-to-Patient Transrnission Rates
The CDC estimates that the transrnission rate of HN from infected surgeon to patient ranges from 24 to 240 transrnissions per 10 million procedures. The range for dentists is 36 to 360 transmissions per 100 million procedure~.'~ For our baseline analysis, we have developed an average transmission rate scenano. This average transrnission rate scenario uses the average of the per-procedure transmission rate CQST-EFFECT~NESS OF HiV SCREENING PROGRAM: FOR estimates for each profession, 132 transrnissions per 10 million procedures for surgeons and 198 transmissions per 100 million procedures for dentists. However, we also assume that oIie surgeon and one dentist eacli year have a rnuch higher transrnission rate of 588 transmissions per 100,000 procedures. This additional assumption accounts for one practitioner each year who infects patients at a rate consistent with the dental practice where H N was tran~mitted.~ Five of approxirnately 850 of this dentist's patients are believed to have contracted H N frorn him in a ciinical setting.
To derive our transmission rate, we assume that each patient had only one procedure p e r f~r m e d .~~ Our transmission rates are estimated in units of transrnissions per procedure. Therefore, it is necessary to know the number of procedures performed per year to calculate the number of transmissions. We estimate that surgeons perform 500 procedures and dentists perform 3,000 procedures per ~e a r . ~~ We aiso assume that healthcare workers infected between screens in the yearly screening scenarios are infected and able to transmit the virus for half of the year. This estímate assumes that practitioners are infected at a constant rate throughout the year.
DISCOUNTING COSTS AND TRANSMISSIONS PREVENTED
A11 program costs and effects (transmissions prevented) incurred in future years are discounted at 5% per annum to January 1, 1994. This is standard economic practice to account for the fact that future program costs and effects, even controlling for inflation, are not equal in value to current costs and e f f e c t~.~~ This is because money spent on a screening progi-arn today could be invested altematively elsewhere. For exarnple, $100 invested at 5% interest would yield $105 in 1 year. Discounting corrects for this phenornenon and allows us to sum al1 discounted costs and effects incurred in future years to derive a single cost-effectiveness ratio.
In order to determine the sensitivity of the model to its assumptions, crítica1 cost and probabiiity estimates are varied over a range of plausible values to determine their impact on the final cost-effectiveness ratios. Parameters varied include the probability of H N transmission to patients in clinical settings, number of infected surgcons and dentists at initiatioii oí the program, the yearly incidence of H N infection, the percentage of infected and uninfected surgeons arid dentists who are tested, the degree to which an HWpositive identified surgeon or dentist would reduce risk, the costs of testing and counseling, the costs of HN/AIDS treatment, and the number of procedures performed per year. Each of these has an impact on the results and is described below.
mum Screening Cost-Effectiveness
Tables 3A and 3B present the main results of our cost-effectiveness analysis of screening programs. Included are total costs, the number of transmissions still occumng under each program, the number of prevented transmissions for each program, and the resulting incremental costeffectiveness ratios. The baseline results are presented for surgeons and dentists separately, using the average transmission rate scenario descnbed above. These are followed by results assuming maximum and minimum transrnission rate scenarios.
MTe found total discounted costs of screening programs of surgeons Vable 3A) in our baseline analysis range from $7.0 million for a one-time voluntary screening program to $82.9 million for an anri~al mandatory screening program. For dentists Vable 3B), discounted program costs range from $23.4 million for a one-time voluntary screening program to $101.3 million for an annual mandatory screening program. We project about 12 cases of H N transrnission would occur without a surgeon screening program in the years 1994 to 2008 Vable 3A). A one-time voluntary screening program would prevent 60% (about eight) of these cases, while a 15year mandatory program would avoid virtually al1 Vable 3A). For dentists, we project 267.21 H N transmissions would occur without a screening program during the years 1994 to 2008 Vable 3B). Of these, a one-time voluntary prograrn would prevent about 60% (168 cases), while a 1Syear mandatory program would prevent almost al1 Vable 3B).
For both surgeons and dentists, one-time voluntary screening programs are most cost-effective, costing about $899,338 Vable 3A) and $139,571 Vable 3B) per transmission prevented respectively. These programs are more expensive than many other interventions to prevent H N transmissions, but are an IXFECTION CO~I-ROL .ASD HOSPITIL EPII>EA~IOLOGY October 1994 order of rnagnitude less expensive than yearly mandatory prograrns that cost $63.3 rnillior, (Table 3A) for every surgical transmission prevented and $2.2 million cable 3B) for every dental transrnission prevented.
Sensitivity of Results
Our initial sensitiviíy analysis addresses the assurnptions we rnake regarding per-procedure rates of transrnission frorn infected practitioner to patient. We examine two altematives, rninirnurn and rnaxirnurn transrnission rate scenarios. For the rninirnurn transrnission rate scenano, we use the lower bound of the transmission range estimated by the CDC as descnbed earlier. For the rnaxirnurn transrnission rate scenario, we use the upper range values and, in addition, we assurne that 1% of practitioners (rather than a single surgeon and dentist) are more irifective, at a rate of 588 transmissions per 100,000 procedures. These results are presented in Tables 3A and 3B. For surgeons, the cost per prevented transrnission of a one-time voluntan-screening program is $176,311 in the maximurn transrnission rate scenario and $4.8 rniilion in the minirnurn transnlission rate scenario cable 3A). Varying the transrnission rate scenarios produces a sirnilarly dramatic change in results for dentists. For dentists, the cost per prevented transrnission of a one-time voluntary screening prograrn is $57,155 in the maxirnurn transrnission rate scenario and $582,955 in the minirnurn transrnission rate scenano cable 3B).
In Tables 4A and 4B, we examine how othrr rnodel assurnptions affect our results. The last colurnn of this table presents the rnost costeffective program after the assumption has been varied. For exarnple, our rnodel assumes that there are 349 infected surgeons as of January 1, 1994. If we halve this estimate, costeffectiveness remains lowest for the one-time voluntary prograrn but increases frorn our baseline costeffectiveness ratio of $899,336 to $1,154,530. If the estirnate is doubled to 698 surgeons, the ratio decreases to $742,644 per prevented transmission.
None of the assumptions in Tables 4A and 4B radically change our rnain findings. That is, no prograrn's cost-effectiveness ratio is particularly sensitive to modification of the assumptions. For surgeons, the , .
%l. 15 No. 10 We also End that a one-time mandatory prqgram dominates a one-time voluntary program (ie, is both cheaper and prevents more transmissions) for both surgeons and dentists when: 1) the percentage of infected surgeons or dentists who voluntarily test themselves decreases, 2) the percentage of uninfected surgeons or dentists who voluntarily test themselves increases, 3) the percentage of HIVpositive surgeons or dentists who refuse to reduce their risk of trznsrnission increases. or 4) the cost of counseling decreases. In no cases were yearly screening programs more cost-effective than one-time screening programs.
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DISCUSSION
We found one-time voluntary H N screening programs of surgeoIis and dentists to be most costeffective, costing about $899,336 and $139,571 per transmission prevented, respectively. We performed a cost-effectiveness analysis rather than a cost-benefit analysis because it allowed us to focus on preventing H N transmissions, the most imrnediate goal of the screening programs, without introducing problematic estimates of the value of life. Likewise, we did not consider quality of life ramifications of screening programs which. while clearly important, merit an investigation that is beyond the scope of this analysis.
It is informative to compare our results with other studies that use the same effectiveness measure, H N transmissions prevented. In a study exanriniiig the cost-effectiveness of screening healthcare workers, Phillips et al3'' obtained results consistent with an incremental costeffectiveness of $326,000 per HIV transmission prevented for a one-time mandatory screening of surgeons and $563.000 for d e n t i~t s .~~ The difference between these results and ours is due largely to the effectiveness attributed to voluntary screening programs and the incremental effectiveness of mandatory programs. Phillips et a13O assurne that fewer than half of practitioners would change their behavior after screening HIV positive in a voluntary program. The importante of this assumption points to an area where more research is needed.
One study by Eisenstaedt and Getzen31 found that blood donor screening strategizs cost $124,089 for every transfusion-transmitted casc of HIV infection prevented. Schwartz et aln found, using modified screening strategies, that it cost $16,850 to identify an HIV-positive unit of blood in high-prevalence areas and $32,275 per unit idenüñed in low-prevalence areas (assuming that each of these units results in a single case of HIV infection, these figures represent the costs of transmissions prevented). Mendelson and SandleP2 provide an additional blood donor screening analysis. They found that adding a test for HIV antigen to current testing methodologies cost $18 million to $24 rnillion for each additional transfusion-transmitted case of HIV prevented.
McKay and Phillips33 analyzed mandatory premarital screening for HIV and found that it would cost between $70,000 and $127,000 for each case of HIV infection prevented. In an additional analysis. Stock et a134 found that implementation of the CDC's universal precautions at a 450-bed, acute-care teaching hospital in Hamilton, Ontario, would cost $8 d i o n per h-ansrnission to healthcare worker prevented.
?he cost to prevent transmission of HIV using blood donor and premarital screening strategies is less than the cost of any of the surgeon or dentist screening programs we have considered in our rnodeL The implementation of universal precautions in a hospital similar to that studied by Stock et al is more -expensive than the one-time (mandatory or voluntary) screening strategies we analyzed. Considering the promotion of universal precautions and the suspension of several premarital screening programs, it is apparent that noneconornic factors have been important deterrninants of screening policy.
In a study similar to ours, Russo and LaCroi~?~ building upon the work,of Gerberding,36 found that mandatory screening in a San Francisco 'hospital would cost $780,000 annudy and produce $58,080 to $83,635 in benefits. It is possible to calculate the number of transmissions prevented rather than dollar benefits from the Russo and LaCroix article. Doing so, we find that the expected cost-eff~ctiveness oi the mandatory screening program would range from $8.4 million to $83.6 million per preYented transmission at this hospital. The Russo and LaCrok study is limited, however, in that it only examined one hospital in San Francisco, only considered a mandatory screening scenario, used the same HIV transmission rate for both surgeons and dentists, and examined only the first year of the screening program.
CONCLUSIONS
\
We found that one-time screening programs, both voluntary and mandatory, were more costeffective than annual screening programs. The annual . screening programs detected the sarne cases as the one-time programs during the first year, but subsequent yearly screenings-detect many fewer incident cases while continuing to incur large costs. Thus, while one-time programs prevented fewer total HIV transmissions than annual programs, they cost significantiy less. The investrneiit of healthcare resources in annual screening programs for surgeons and dentists is clearly an inefficient use of resources. One-time prograrns are expensive. but fa11 in the r u g e of other prograrns to prevent transmissions of H N 'Iñe diierence between mandatory and voluntary screening programs is less obvious than the differ-.
ence between annual and one-time screening prograrns, but it accounts for substantial variation in program costeffectiveness. In general, whether onetime voluntary or mandatory prograrns are preferred in our model for both surgeons and dentists depends on the number of infected practitioners at the begin-! ning of the screening program, the proportion of
